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ABSTRACT

This guide helps people understand where and how decisions on nuclear warfare are made in the United States government. The guide is organized into five main sections. "The Nature of the American Political System" covers the development of a republican form of democracy governed by checks and balances and designed so that power is shared by different branches. The characteristics of Congress as a whole and the specific committees in Congress that deal with issues related to nuclear war are covered in "The Institutions: The Congress." The section entitled "The Institutions: The Executive" discusses how the executive branch is divided by many of the same issues as Congress, even though it appears to have a more straightforward line of authority. In "The Citizen's Link: Elections," the role of the election process as well as the outcome of specific elections is stressed. A list of the members of key congressional committees for the 98th Congress and a list of additional sources of information are appended. (IS)

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

A Citizen's Guide to Government ion-Making on N War

by No stein

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Foreword by Dorothy S. Ridings, President,
League of Women Voters of the United States

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This book was written by Norman Ornstein, Professor of Politics at the Catholic University in Washington, D.C., for distribution by United Campuses to Prevent Nuclear War (UCAM), Common Cause, and other organizations involved in educating the public about nuclear arms issues. Editorial assistance was provided by Sanford Gottlieb, executive director of UCAM, and Stephen Hitchner, vice president for issue development of Common Cause. Financial support was provided by grants from the W. Alton Jones Foundation and the Ploughshares Fund.

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Foreword

Who Decides? A Citizen's Guide to Government Decision-Making on Nuclear War reveals the winding trail for exploration of the vast U.S. foreign and military policy-making frontier. It is an especially important guide at this time in light of the critical public debate over some very fundamental questions:

- What is America's purpose in the world?
- What are the values underlying U.S. policy?
- How can we best secure our interests?

The League calls these "the citizens' questions" because they give the citizen equal standing with the president, senators and generals. And they are a key to the more specialized debate over specific issues such as deployment of the MX missile, development of space wars technology, and the nuclear freeze, to name only a few of the current issues referred to in *Who Decides?*

Most people don't realize that making *your* voice heard in Washington on these and all issues is both effective and easy. Although it is everybody's right and responsibility to get involved in the governmental process, most don't. And that is especially true in matters involving U.S. foreign and military policy.

Who Decides? sheds light on some of the historical barriers to citizen action, but provides useful basics on the mechanics of the process that will help channel today's advocacy efforts. It also adds an insightful dimension by describing some of the interrelationships among decision-making structures, overlapping bureaucracies and the role of personalities in determining when and where certain issues are raised. For all of these reasons, *Who Decides?* is a valuable guide.

Dorothy S. Ridings
President
League of Women Voters
of the United States

Introduction

The American political system is designed to accommodate citizen action. Our First Amendment doesn't just guarantee freedom of religion and speech; it protects "the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances." These rights have provided the basis for public input into virtually every important policy decision considered in the United States. Thus, citizen concern about public policy is a given in the American political system.

That public concern today is great in the area of nuclear policy comes as no surprise—there is no issue that is more vital to the long-term future of our country and our world than minimizing the risk of a future nuclear war. And, of course, there are few issue areas more complicated. Technology transfers, weapons systems, non-proliferation, civil defense, SALT and START treaties, nuclear power, NATO, every facet of foreign policy and many of domestic are all tied into the broader question, and there are different opinions expressed by people of good faith on how to deal with each of these issues in a way that would best prevent the use of nuclear weapons.

Regardless of one's individual views, it is the obligation of citizens who want to get involved in this policy debate to become informed not only about the issues, but also about the institutional processes that help shape the way those issues are decided. This guide is intended to develop understanding of how the American political and policy processes work. For those who want to make their views known and influence the decisions on nuclear arms policy, it is vital to understand how the system works. First and foremost, citizens must start with the realization that there are no simple answers. Government decision-making is diffuse, complex, and multi-layered. There are many actors at every stage and many forms which decisions can take. Furthermore, there are many types of decisions which can affect any broad area, from nuclear arms to veterans' benefits.

Unfortunately, understanding *who makes policy decisions—and how* they are made—is a difficult task in any political system, or for that matter, in any complex institution or organization. With its checks and balances, multiple points of decision and numerous actors, it is even more difficult in the American political system. Non-Americans, including those from western democracies, are often completely perplexed by the nature of the American system. Many are used to clear lines of authority, especially in foreign policy decisions, with an executive in charge and accountable.

The American system, with a Congress composed of more than 300 separate committees and subcommittees and 540 individual members (including five non-voting delegates), combined with an execu-

tive branch with its own independent political goals and lines of authority, many going to Congress and not to the White House, is out of the bounds of experience for citizens of most other countries. But there are guidelines and themes that undergird the American system that help us to understand how the system works, who makes decisions, and how those decisions are made.

The Nature of the American Political System

In their deliberations on the Constitution, America's Founding Fathers showed their concern and ambivalence about the role of the public in the new American policy process. The Founders wanted a direct and important link between the public and their government—they created a democratic system with frequent and regular elections, after all—but they also wanted to insulate the government from the whims and emotions of transitory public opinion, and to protect against the possible "tyranny of a majority" that could come with a total and unlimited direct democracy.

The result was a compromise, a "republican" form of democracy. This meant democracy by elected representatives, who would work in a system of checks and balances with different levels of insulation from different publics. The House of Representatives was closest to the public; it was given primacy in the Constitution and some unique powers along with its two-year terms and direct elections. It joined in sharing political powers with a much less democratic Senate representing states (and therefore larger constituencies), without direct elections (until 1913, Senators were selected for the most part by a small group of powerful members of their state legislatures). Senators, serving six-year terms, were expected by the Founders to cool the public passions aroused through the House. Then there was the president, serving the entire nation but elected *indirectly*, through an electoral college (in the early years of the Republic, popular votes for president meant little, not even serving as the primary means for choosing electors or allocating each state's electoral votes).

The bottom line: the American political system was designed *not* to be a pure democracy. Representatives, designated by the people, were to make the crucial policy decisions, with some independence and insulation from the people who elected or selected them. This system could be attacked, justifiably, as elitist, but it was carefully thought through and shaped to balance and protect, in the long run, the bases and values of the country. With some necessary modifications over time, it has indeed worked in that way.

Another of the Founding Fathers' foremost concerns in designing our political system was a fear of accumulated power, of power concentrated in the hands of any one individual or institution. They believed deeply the dictum that power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. So, relying on the theories of Montesquieu and others, they designed a system that divided and overlapped the key powers of government.

The system was created not only to share powers among the three branches of the national government—Congress, the presidency, the Supreme Court—but also to divide and share power *within* these branches. Thus, for example, the

Congress was set up to consist of two separate chambers with some unique and some shared powers, and evolved into each chamber decentralizing into committees. The executive branch consists not only of a president, but also of agencies that owe allegiance and responsibility to Congress and their own separate constituencies. The Supreme Court consists of several individuals who have their own individual bases of power.

This philosophy of divided and shared powers was made particularly concrete in several specific areas of political power, namely, foreign policy and the power of the purse. In foreign policy, the Founding Fathers debated at length the relative roles of the president and Congress and, within Congress, of the Senate and the House. There was substantial debate over the war-making powers and an ultimate decision to divide that power, giving Congress the right to make the basic policy decisions—like declarations of war—and the president the right to implement those policy decisions through his constitutional role as Commander-in-Chief. The Founding Fathers also decided to give some unique powers to the United States Senate in the foreign policy area. Foremost among these was the power to give the president advice and consent on any treaties negotiated with foreign governments or entities. A president may negotiate a treaty, but it does not become United States law unless and until two-thirds of the Senate consents. The Senate was given another unique power that spans many areas but also includes foreign policy: the ability to confirm presidential appointments to high-level positions in the executive branch. The president may nominate ambassadors and cabinet officers, such as the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense or the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, but these top officials are not allowed to assume their jobs unless a majority of the Senate confirms their appointments.

> ***"The Founding Fathers gave some unique powers to the Senate in the foreign policy area."***

These Senate responsibilities are not matched in foreign policy by the House of Representatives, but the House was not rendered powerless in the Constitution. Besides having a co-equal status with the Senate in declaring war, the House is given a preeminent position in the area of money, the power of the purse. The Constitution says that all revenue measures—tax bills, tariffs, etc.—shall originate in the House, and by tradition since the beginning of the Republic, appropriations or spending bills have also originated there. Few government actions, from deploying troops to developing weapons systems to implementing the provisions of a treaty, can be done without money, so the House, if it wants to, has the ability to get involved in key foreign policy areas. Indeed, in recent times, House members who disagreed with the

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Senate's ratification of the Panama Canal treaty negotiatd by President Carter tried to use their appropriations to block the treaty's implementation.

All of this would seem to suggest precise, if divided lines of authority between the branches and within the Congress. But in fact, what the Founding Fathers did was to set up a system with broad guidelines defining basic authority; precise policy divisions, left to the imagination and tenacity of politicians and to the nature of the times, are blurred and ever-changing.

Consider treaties, for example—an area where, as we have suggested, the lines *appear* to be drawn precisely. But they are not. In some instances, especially in the last 20 years, presidents have been able to avoid a Senate ratification vote by using the device of an Executive agreement. An Executive agreement, which is defined by law, not the Constitution, does not require Senate participation; it can be done just by the President.* This was the case when, in May 1984, President Reagan sent 400 Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia. For another example, take the SALT II treaty. President Carter negotiated this treaty with the Soviet Union and signed it, but the Senate never voted on its ratification; indeed, one reason the vote never took place was the fear of Carter and his party leaders—a very real one—that the Senate would reject the treaty. However, in spite of the fact that this treaty was never ratified, its provisions are

*This is not the case, however, with Executive agreements related to arms control or disarmament. In the legislation establishing the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Congress required that any such Executive agreements be approved by a majority vote of both houses of Congress. The SALT I Interim Agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was approved in this fashion in 1972.



being adhered to by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Whether it is by an Executive Agreement or a treaty adhered to but never formally ratified, these examples suggest the flexible nature of the American Constitution and the American political system. The Constitution provides a framework for give and take and, in most instances, compromise. It does not provide a blueprint for action. No one actor, whether President, Speaker of the House, Senate Majority Leader, or Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and no one set of actors can determine the agenda or unilaterally make the decisions. This suggests, of course, that citizens concerned about nuclear arms issues have many places they can seek to influence policy decisions, from presidential assistants to senior civil servants, to congressional leaders, to congressional rank-and-file members, to congressional staffs or even judges.

The Institutions: The Congress

The most accessible place for citizen influence, in the Constitution and through practical experience, is the Congress of the United States. The Congress was intended to be the people's branch. Citizens visiting Washington can see quite clearly and physically why this is so. Congress is perhaps the most open political institution in the world. It is very difficult for a citizen to get into the White House; even the tours, which are restricted to a handful of public rooms, require citizens to stand in line for long periods of time. Wandering through executive offices is not allowed. Neither can one wander at will through the Supreme Court building, or easily sit in on a Supreme Court session. It is nearly as difficult to get an audience with a Supreme Court Justice as it is with a cabinet member, or the President of the United States.

Congress is different. Even though security provisions, in light of recent bombing attempts, have been tightened somewhat, one can walk into the Capitol or any of the numerous House and Senate office buildings almost at will. Members of Congress walk the corridors freely. Access to the House and Senate chambers, and to committee and subcommittee meetings, is open and easy. Constituents have little difficulty gaining an audience with their representatives or senators while sessions take place.

But access to Congress means little unless a citizen understands how the legislative process works, who is important at what stage of the process, and where decisions are made. Congress itself is almost as complicated as the political system generally. To begin, of course, it consists of two chambers —the House of Representatives and the Senate—which are separate and unique but have a number of important similarities. Three generalities about Congress as a whole are particularly important to understanding how decisions are made in the legislative process:

- *Congress is decentralized.* Congress is and always has been an institution which relies upon a division of labor and spreads its power and decision-making authority to a large number of individuals and internal institutions. The backbone of this decentralized process is the committee system, which we will discuss below.
- *Congress is democratized.* This has not always been true. There have been periods in our history (from 1890 to 1910, for example) when Congress was ruled by autocratic leaders, with rank-and-file members simply following along. Today, however, after more than a decade of reforms, Congress is an institution in which every rank-and-file member has a significant role to play. Every member also has significant resources—staff, computers, etc.—to get across his or her point of view, to offer amendments to bills, and to influence policy-making.
- *Congress is diffused.* Congress' control over its areas of legislative

responsibility is not sharply delineated. It is diffused into a large number of overlapping and interlocking bodies. No area of policy is confined to a single individual or a single institution.

The committee system

"Congress on the floor is Congress on public exhibition. Congress in its committee rooms is Congress at work." There is no beter-known dictum in politics than this one, written 100 years ago by political scientist Woodrow Wilson. If we were to change it today, we would substitute "subcommittee" for "committee." The House of Representatives in 1983 counted 139 subcommittees; the Senate, 106. Each has some degree of independence, and nearly all have their own professional staffs. In 1983, subcommittees and committees in the House alone held well over 3,000 separate hearings on the whole gamut of public policy subjects. The Senate's panels did the same.

The activity in these subcommittees, in both the House and the Senate, has increased and diversified in the past 10 years. Reforms have spread power, staff and initiatives to the subcommittees, and have expanded the number of members who chair panels. The result is a large group of active and interested subcommittee chairmen. Formal jurisdictions have not been able to contain their interests, and so a given subcommittee may hold hearings and assert authority in almost any conceivable area.

Committees, subcommittees and nuclear policy

The specific subject of a nuclear freeze, to the extent that Congress might get involved, is formally in the hands of the two committees with broadest jurisdiction over nuclear arms control, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. When the House considered—and ultimately passed—a resolution in 1983 calling for negotiation of a mutual and verifiable freeze of nuclear weapons, the resolution came from the Foreign Affairs Committee. However, the history of that resolution tells us



something about the fluid nature of Congress. First, a prime sponsor of the resolution, Representative Ed Markey of Massachusetts, was not even a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. His committee assignments (and, therefore, his major areas of concentration) were seemingly far removed from the nuclear weapons arena.

Secondly, the floor debate on the freeze resolution turned into a contest between its sponsoring committee, Foreign Affairs, and an interloper, the more hawkish, anti-freeze Armed Services Committee, for debate time. The wrangling began in the House Rules Committee, which sets the guidelines for debate—how much time, how many amendments, who controls the discussion. Even though the Foreign Affairs panel was supported by Rules, however, the Armed Services advocates refused to surrender. The result was a freewheeling, uncontrolled debate that delayed passage of the House resolution for weeks. The resolution did pass, but the fracas underscored the fluid and unpredictable atmosphere in Congress today.

So, the issue of a nuclear freeze *per se* had to contend with both the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees in the House. But many other committees and subcommittees also have a significant role to play in policy areas that affect nuclear weapons and power, and each has a base to express that interest.

Consider the House. Its 22 standing committees are listed below. Those with a claim to a nuclear arms focus have asterisks beside them.

House Standing Committees

Agriculture
*Appropriations
*Armed Services
*Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
*Budget
*District of Columbia
*Education and Labor
*Energy and Commerce
*Foreign Affairs
*Government Operations
House Administration
*Interior and Insular Affairs
*Judiciary
Merchant Marine and Fisheries
*Post Office and Civil Service
Public Works and Transportation
*Rules
*Science and Technology
*Small Business
Standards of Official Conduct
*Veterans Affairs
*Ways and Means

Virtually *every* committee, in other words, has some wedge into the nuclear policy debate. The Appropriations Committee handles money—including the money for research, development, testing and deployment of every weapons system. The Banking Committee's Economic Stabilization Subcommittee has jurisdiction over the Defense Production Act, which is more related to economics than to defense or weapons, but the jurisdiction is easily sufficient to enable a vigorous subcommittee chairman to hold hearings on military contractors and nuclear weapons production. Budget is another key money committee. The District of Columbia Committee has a subcommittee with jurisdiction over nuclear preparedness in the capital. Energy and Commerce has jurisdiction over the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Judiciary Committee's crime subcommittee gets into the protection of plutonium and other nuclear material. Post

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Office and Civil Service has some jurisdiction over preparedness; Small Business, over procurement policy. And Ways and Means controls trade, including regulation of high technology transfers. And so on. The same pattern prevails in the Senate.

Of course, not every committee is equal; some, in a sustained way, are more crucial than others to the main nuclear-related issues. The key ones, naturally enough, are most concerned with foreign policy and defense. In each house, there are three basic units: the foreign policy authorization panel (Foreign Affairs in the House, Foreign Relations in the Senate); the defense authorization committee (House and Senate Armed Services); and the defense money panel (in each house, the defense subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee). The members of these panels are listed in an appendix to this guide.

> ***"The first key decisions are made in the committee."***

There are three important panels in each house, not two, because Congress divides public policy into *authorizations* of programs and *appropriations* of funds to pay for the programs (or, to put it more simply, between substance and money). Some decisions in the nuclear area may not require an explicit expenditure of public funds—like, say, an arms control treaty. Such a treaty would be in the purview of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before being brought to the floor for an overall vote. But other decisions—say, on weapons systems—need congressional authorization followed by the appropriation of money. In each house, the MX missile, for example, needed first to be approved substantively by the Armed Services Committee as part of the annual defense authorization bill. But then, before either research or deployment took place, dollars for those purposes had to be appropriated, starting with the Appropriations Committee and its defense subcommittee.

On a controversial issue like the MX, congressional battles may be fought separately as many as 10 times a year—the authorization fights within both Armed Services Committees; the money fights, first in the appropriations subcommittees on defense, then in both full Appropriations Committees; and separately, again, in authorization and appropriations battles on the House and Senate floors.* The final stages, on the floor, tend to get the most publicity (after all, the floor is the point of overall ratification), but the first key decisions are made in the committees. For example, the fight on the Senate floor over the MX missile in June 1984 was about production of 21 MXs, not the 40

*As suggested by the debate over the freeze resolution, discussed earlier, there may also be a fight in the Rules Committee of the House over the terms by which a measure will be considered on the House floor.

missiles requested by President Reagan. The Senate Armed Services Committee had acted earlier to cut the President's request.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee. This committee historically has not been one of the most prestigious or active in the House. In the early 1970s, however, it was the focus of many of the House reforms that invigorated subcommittees, and such subcommittee chairmen as Don Fraser of Minnesota, Ben Rosenthal of New York and Lee Hamilton of Indiana raised important foreign policy questions and made them a part of the policy debate (for example, the issue of human rights). In the past few years, with the departure of Fraser, Rosenthal and others and without a strong chairman, the committee has become less central, including its role, mentioned above, in the nuclear freeze resolution. However, under the new and vigorous leadership of Chairman Dante Fascell of Florida, the committee is reasserting itself. It is limited, though, by its image as a committee that is considerably more liberal than the rest of the House.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Because of its unique power of treaty ratification, the Senate has always been an important force in foreign affairs. Within the Senate, the responsibility for treaties has been vested since 1816 in the Foreign Relations Committee. But this preeminent committee in the area of international affairs has diminished in prestige over the past decade, for several reasons. One is that the committee has been plagued with a succession of chairmen who have either been highly controversial or lacked the public stature of such predecessors as J. William Fulbright or Arthur Vandenberg. Another reason is that a number of members have lost their reelection bids in recent years, giving the committee a reputation as an albatross. In addition, the committee has been perceived as being unrepresentative of the Senate as a whole.

Thus, the Foreign Relations Committee's deliberations on the SALT II treaty were not given great weight by the Senate—and the more aggressive, and more respected, Armed Services Committee moved in to hold its own hearings and preempt a part of the territory. Still, Foreign Relations has public prestige, a distinguished history, some prominent members (including Howard Baker, Charles Percy, Charles Mathias, Paul Sarbanes, Alan Cranston, and John Glenn), and formal jurisdiction over treaties, foreign arms sales, and presidential appointments of ambassadors and State Department officials.

The House Armed Services Committee. Traditionally more conservative than the House as a whole, this panel has become more important in recent years with the reforms that spread power to subcommittees and their chairs. Currently, such relatively liberal representatives as Les Aspin (D-Wisc.) and Ron Dellums (D-Calif.) serve as subcommittee chairmen, while Pat Schroeder (D-Colo.) is next in line. Aspin, especially, has been a major figure in the debates over weapons systems and Pentagon waste for more than a decade. He was instrumental most recently in seeking to work out an agreement between President Reagan and the House to keep the MX missile alive.

This committee is especially important because it approves the authorizing legislation for all weapons systems, and carries the

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

debate on them to the House floor. And, of course, the crux of the congressional debate on nuclear policy, over the past two decades, has come on weapons systems, from the anti-ballistic missile system to the B-1 bomber and the MX missile. Despite its conservative reputation, the committee now has a number of members who are less doctrinaire—like Nick Mavroules (D-Mass.), a nuclear freeze advocate and leader of the anti-MX forces, Dennis Hertel (D-Mich.), Norman Sisisky (D-Va.), John Spratt (D-S.C.), and Francis X. McCloskey (D-Ind.), who will move up the seniority ladder and attain more influence in the years to come.

The Senate Armed Services Committee. This committee has become prominent and important in recent years, largely as a result of its aggressive, conservative leadership, under the likes of John Stennis (D-Miss.) and John Tower (R-Tex.), and its highly respected membership. With the retirement of Tower (and the death in 1983 of Henry "Scoop" Jackson), the intellectual leadership on the committee will pass to a group of moderate conservatives like Democrat Sam Nunn of Georgia and Republican William Cohen of Maine. Nunn, Cohen, and their allies favor a strong defense, but, unlike their predecessors, do not automatically accept Pentagon policy. Other key people on the committee include senior Republicans Strom Thurmond (S.C.) and Barry Goldwater (Ariz.) and, in the junior ranks, Republican John Warner (Va.) and Pete Wilson (Calif.), and



Democrats Gary Hart (Colo.), Carl Levin (Mich.), Ted Kennedy (Mass.) and Jeff Bingaman (N.M.).

The Defense Appropriations Subcommittees. These House and Senate subcommittees are the money panels. Even if such weapons systems as the B-1 bomber or the MX missile are authorized, they will not go anywhere until money is appropriated for them. The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee is chaired by Joseph Addabbo (D-N.Y.), a frequent critic of the Pentagon and weapons systems, but his views place him in the minority on his own subcommittee. On the Senate side, the subcommittee also tends to be hawkish; it is chaired by Republican Ted Stevens of Alaska, while John Stennis serves as the top Democrat. In both houses, the votes in the defense subcommittees on controversial weapons are usually repeated, but sometimes reversed, by the full Appropriations Committees.

In any event, the issues usually spill over onto the floors of the House and Senate for resolution—and then to the *conference committees* for House-Senate compromises. Conferences are *ad hoc* meetings of members appointed from both chambers to reconcile the differences between parallel bills passed by the House and the Senate. The conference committees are normally filled with more senior members of the relevant committees, and they have great power to rearrange the details of bills.

Remember that committees and subcommittees are important for their substantive jurisidiction, their votes on key issues, their role in resolving House-Senate differences, and their ability to spotlight or raise issues through hearings. But floor debate and floor amendments are also important, since few issues get bottled up completely in committee or resolved firmly before they get to the floor (this has been particularly true of weapons systems). On the floor, any member can offer an amendment—unless the rules governing debate on a particular bill state otherwise—and many do. Thus, power is spread across the two chambers on all of these issues, and not restricted only to the prime committees.

If a committee or subcommittee won't act the way an individual citizen or interest group would like, the citizen or group often has recourse to the actions taken on the floors of the House and Senate, and the opportunity to pick an advocate from among a broader group of legislators than only the members of a given committee.

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In sum, then, Congress is at once a fluid, open, unpredictable and decentralized institution—and a structured, hierarchical, committee-oriented, seniority-based institution. What does all this mean for citizens? First is that conventional wisdom or narrow, legalistic interpretation of who's in charge in Congress may well be mistaken or misguided. For one who is trying to *interpret* what Congress is doing, this means that attention has to be paid to legislators and staffers on a wide range of committees. Important nuclear-related initiatives or opposition can come from almost anywhere, and certainly isn't restricted to the foreign policy and armed services committees.

That doesn't mean that action in Congress is regulated by luck alone, or by random actions. Success or failure in a legislative battle is still most likely to turn on a variety of traditional elements: the skill of the leaders and their allies in structuring the issue; building public attention, support and momentum through hearings, speeches and press releases; gaining legislative support through co-sponsorship, and building, step by step, a winning coalition of 50% plus one. What is untraditional is that the outcomes and the battles are not always predictable, and the process is open and freewheeling.

To observers, this can mean confusion. To the *actors* involved, it can make problems—but the situation also means opportunities. Citizens concerned with an issue like nuclear weapons can now find many places in Congress, some rather unlikely, which can serve as forums for public debate or initiation of policy ideas. Any of perhaps 75 to 100 subcommittees in the House and Senate could be a forum for a hearing or a report; thus, any of 75 to 100 subcommittee chairmen are potential allies. The active and involved citizen will study *The Almanac of American Politics* and/or *Politics in America* to learn about these key Members of Congress, and will examine the flow of issues and action in the weekly journals *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* and *National Journal.*

More broadly, *all* 535 legislators in Congress are important these days. Power is not limited to a relative handful of senior power brokers. Thus, individual citizens and citizens' groups can find a number of potential allies on Capitol Hill who can speak on the House or Senate floor, put statements into the *Congressional Record*, introduce bills or offer floor amendments to legislation, and seek co-sponsors—all actions of potential significance. And it is much easier now to find allies who are subcommittee chairmen. They can hold hearings, which get public attention and put positions and ideas formally on the record.

There can be, of course, too much action and too much pressure; legislative overkill is a real and ever-present danger. Legislators and lobbyists alike try to coordinate their legislative pressures and



efforts, and citizens should try to work within the framework of existing organizations, or to follow the lead suggested by their own lawmakers. But the most important point to remember is that opportunties for input and action are almost universal.

The most obvious, and best, place for individual citizen input is with one's own Members of Congress or with the other members of the state's congressional delegation. Legislators read and heed letters from constituents—especially those individually written—and they will nearly always say hello to constituents who visit their offices in Washington. Letting your lawmakers know your concerns can help determine their priorities and shape their views of local public opinion.

Nor do the opportunities end with Members of Congress and their committees. One of the most striking aspects of change in the modern Congress has been the expansion in size and importance of professional staffs. There are nearly 3,000 employees of House and Senate standing committees, along with an additional 11,000-plus staff for individual Members of Congress, and over 6,500 employees of congressional support agencies like the Congressional Research Service, the Office of Technology Assessment and the General Accounting Office.

Lobbyists these days generally spend much more time with staffers than they do with members. Citizens who visit Congress or contact their representatives should not be offended that they are being "shunted aside." Staff can be important and influential agents in the legislative process. Committee staffers can set the agenda and shape its content; personal staffers often negotiate for their bosses and help shape legislative strategy; support agency staffers may write vital research and position papers, investigate Pentagon procurement practices or examine the qualities of weapons systems.

How a Bill Becomes a Law

This chart shows the most typical way in which proposed legislation is enacted into law and highlights special times in the flow of this process when constituent mail can be especially productive.

After a bill is introduced by a Senator or Representative, it is assigned to the appropriate committee according to subject area. Here it is studied and rewritten. Hearings are frequently held to solicit both public and special interest views.

When the bill eventually clears the committee, it goes to the floor for general debate and action.

Once both Houses pass a bill, a "conference committee" made up of both Senators and Representatives works out any differences between the House-passed and Senate-passed versions.

The final conference version must clear both Houses; then, the bill goes to the president to be signed into law.


*INTRODUCED IN HOUSE
□REFERRED TO HOUSE COMMITTEE
COMMITTEE HOLDS HEARINGS, RECOMMENDS PASSAGE
●HOUSE DEBATES AND PASSES
HOUSE AND SENATE MEMBERS CONFER, REACH COMPROMISE
HOUSE AND SENATE APPROVE COMPROMISE
ALL BILLS MUST GO THROUGH BOTH HOUSE AND SENATE BEFORE REACHING PRESIDENT
●SENATE DEBATES AND PASSES
COMMITTEE HOLDS HEARINGS, RECOMMENDS PASSAGE
*INTRODUCED IN SENATE
□REFERRED TO SENATE COMMITTEE
PRESIDENT SIGNS INTO LAW
MOST LEGISLATION BEGINS AS SIMILAR PROPOSALS IN BOTH HOUSES

*Contact your representatives and ask them to co-sponsor the bill.

□Bills can stall here. Write your representatives and urge them to keep the bill moving.

●As the bill is coming to the floor, urge your representatives to support your position on the bill.

The Institutions: The Executive

Congress is the first branch of government in the Constitution, but in the area of nuclear policy the executive branch comes first. The president, of course, has control over the split-second decisions that might have to be made to determine whether a nuclear attack is in progress—and what the U.S. response will be. In addition, the initiation and conduct of arms control talks and the negotiation of treaties rest in the executive branch. And, in practical terms, the initiation and structure of national security policy, including the recommendation for research and deployment of weapons systems and the Pentagon budget, are all on the executive side.

It is tempting to both outsiders and insiders to view the executive branch as a direct contrast with Congress—*i.e.*, that the executive is disciplined, strictly hierarchical in nature, firmly defined in decision-making authority, long-term in perspective, unswayed by interest group politics, and able to make decisions. It *is* true that the executive branch has a leader—the president—who can make decisions that stick. But while the executive branch is not as undisciplined, permeable, open, diffused and un-

predictable as Congress, it does have its own multiple power centers, struggles for control over policy, short-term viewpoints, and openness to outside groups. And presidents often find that decisions they make disappear in the bowels of agencies, or are thwarted by premature leaks from within the executive branch.

The most important thing to remember about the executive branch is that it is governed by many of the same forces that govern other political institutions. First, there are layers of authority, with different time perspectives, power bases, ideological interests and constituencies. There are, for example, career bureaucracies—not one, but many. In the area of arms control, there is the career foreign service in the State Department, the career arms control civil service in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the career uniformed services, including the Army, Navy and Air Force, each with different interests in the Defense Department. Each of these groups to one degree or another is insulated from removal by the president.

Career officials have their own careers to consider, of course. They also have an institutional memory —going back through the initiatives, successes and failures of past administrations, and their own long-standing relationships with key members and staff in Congress, key lobbyists, and members of the intellectual community. And, of course, career officials have their own personal and political viewpoints.

Then there are political appointees—top-level officials who are appointed by presidents and/or cabinet officers and can be removed by them. Theoretically, these political appointees—numbering perhaps three hundred, broadly defined, in the national security area —are loyal to the president. But many are only weakly connected to their presidential benefactor. Others are loyal first to their agency head, or to their ideological viewpoint, or to their own careers.

Finally, there is the top level of political appointees, the agency heads and cabinet secretaries. These officials usually have high public visibility; along with the president, they form the main public image of the executive branch. But they, too, have their own pressures that make them less than total loyalists to the president. As former Secretary of State Alexander Haig's memoir *Caveat* shows, internal disputes between two cabinet members, between secretaries and White House staffers and/or between secretaries and national security advisers over access to the president, policy ideas, control of turf, and/or personality can dominate foreign policy or national security policy decision-making in an administration. Cabinet members and agency heads, by definition, also represent their own agencies and employees. They may be beholden to interest groups, or concerned about their own futures and ambitions. The central point is that the executive branch is not a monolith. It is likely to be divided and fragmented nearly as much as the Congress.

Beyond questions of loyalty, power bases and personality, there are the questions of issues and jurisdictions. Like Congress, the executive branch is diverse and multifaceted. Dozens of agencies, offices and departments have some formal role to play, or constituency to represent, in the area of nuclear arms and arms control. Each may act independently in its area of jurisdiction, and there is an elaborate process for integrating

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viewpoints in negotiations and decisions.

Negotiations on arms control, for example, almost always have interagency coordinating groups. Whether it is the START talks, talks on INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces), test ban treaties, space weapons or chemical weapons, several agencies assert some claim to involvement—including the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Energy. So each area of treaty talks has its own interagency group, which deliberates as negotiations proceed, taking tentative positions which are forwarded to the National Security Council (NSC) for further study. Positions may be approved by the NSC (and, ultimately, in at least some cases, by the president), and sent out to treaty negotiating teams; or they may be sent back to the interagency groups for further discussion.

In this drawn-out process, many actors may find ways to influence executive decisions—ways as disparate as appealing directly to the president through a "back channel" or leaking information to the press. Such key individuals in the Reagan Administration as Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy; Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Kenneth Adelman, Director of ACDA, are legendary for their skill at bureaucratic infighting.

Sometimes, of course, the elaborate treaty negotiating process is short-circuited by a creative or personal initiative. The best recent example of this was the famous 1983 "walk in the woods" informal negotiation, and subsequent broad agreement, between the chief U.S. negotiator on European missiles, Paul Nitze, and his Soviet counterpart. Their tentative accord on theater nuclear weapons was rejected by both governments (Assistant Secretary Perle was reportedly quite active in opposition inside the Reagan Administration), but the effort showed the potential power



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and real importance of individual personalities in the executive branch. Moreover, the guidelines forged by Ambassador Nitze might well form the basis of a future agreement.

As with Congress, we have to ask the question, what does this mean for citizens? The answer parallels the response about Congress. Anyone trying to interpret the actions or future responses of the president and/or the executive branch must pay attention to a range of characters, in a range of agencies. Some of the most important actors may be relatively minor officials (such as Richard Perle) who get little media or public attention.

Moreover, actions or impulses in agencies with little obvious connection to an issue may be very important. The Commerce Department, which has some jurisdiction over international commerce and trade, has frequently clashed with tne State and Defense Departments over transfers of high technology items, including nuclear technologies, to other countries. Commerce, which has a trade perspective, advocates more such transfers; State, with a foreign policy and (often) a non-proliferation perspective, tends to oppose them. Thus, such players as the Secretary of Commerce and his deputies often get into the act in an important way. Acute observers will know of them, and be able to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses. (The book *Reagan's Ruling Class* offers detailed profiles of top Administration officials, and *National Journal*, a weekly publication, contains comprehensive information on people and policies in government.)

One attempting to influence policy decisions will recognize that the executive branch, like the Congress, offers multiple points of access and fluid decision-making processes. Savvy interest groups, domestic and foreign, develop their own ties to the broadest possible range of executive officials, including White House staffers, top agency officials and career bureaucrats. They never know when access to one official or agency may be important, in and of itself, or to play off against another agency or individual.

Citizen activists will not have the time or resources to copy seasoned professional lobbyists. But they can be more effective if they know who all the players are, and contact them as they do their congressmen. Executive officials get less mail than legislators, but that means they're more likely to pay attention to the letters they do receive.

Executive officials are also influenced by other actors in the political process, from lobbyists to legislators. Political scientists have written extensively about "cozy triangles," or "issue networks," the long-standing relationships among executive agencies, congressional committees and interest groups. Such relationships exist, for example, among the Pentagon, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and such groups as the American Legion and the American Security Council. On the other side, we have career officials of ACDA, the foreign affairs committees, and arms control groups. These relationships endure, and often frustrate presidents who are only short-term participants in ongoing decision-making processes. Citizens can work through interest groups and friendly congressional committees to reach receptive executive officials and reinforce their messages.

The Citizens' Link: Elections

In a democracy such as ours, elections provide the single most important way for citizens' interests and concerns to reach policymakers. But while media analysts and political commentators focus on the *outcomes* of elections—who wins and who loses—the more important citizens' link is the election *process* itself. Certainly, outcomes matter; the Congress changed policy directions dramatically in the late 1960s and early 1970s as conservative Democrats and Republicans were replaced by a growing cadre of moderates and liberals, and swung back to the right in the late 1970s and in 1980 when the reverse occurred. Working in campaigns to defeat candidates one disagrees with and to elect candidates one supports is a key form of citizen participation in politics.

But more broadly, elections frame the discussion and elucidation of issues, the setting of issue positions, the raising of public consciousness. These things can occur in primary campaigns as well as general election contests, and in elections at all levels—from alderman to president.

Campaigns can *make* issues real and serious. Consider the question of the location of the American embassy in Israel. This issue received little or no attention from the public, Congress or the White House until it became a major focal point in the New York Democratic presidential primary in March 1984. At that time, presidential candidates were moved to take positions they might otherwise have avoided; the bill on the issue sponsored by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan was raised from obscurity to prominence (and later, as a consequence of the publicity, altered in content), and the president for the first time said flatly that he would veto the bill if it came to him.

The same thing happened, albeit with less hoopla and controversy, with the issue of the B-1 bomber in the 1976 presidential campaign. In large part through the efforts of

lobbyists working for the anti-B-1 coalition, candidate Jimmy Carter took an early position against the bomber, including flat opposition in his testimony to the Democratic Platform Committee in mid-1976. Coalition supporters, who had raised the issue from obscurity with Carter, reinforced his stance by meeting Carter wherever he went with anti-B-1 signs, passing out leaflets at rallies, and showering journalists with press releases on Carter's Platform Committee testimony. The issue of the B-1 thus became a visible one to the public, and the actions taken by the anti-B-1 forces to influence Carter's position during the 1976 primary campaign and to reinforce it in the general election period made an important difference when Carter had to make a final decision on the B-1 after he became president.

Presidential campaigns are obviously unique in their visibility and national impact. But issues can be highlighted or transformed in importance at other levels as well. In 1982, for example, Congressman Nick Mavroules (D-Mass.) and his Republican challenger, Thomas Trimarco, made the nuclear freeze the centerpiece issue of their campaign. The campaign achieved some national visibility as a result, the freeze issue became far more salient to the voters in Massachusetts' Sixth District, and the issue gained momentum and credibility when Mavroules won handily with 58% of the vote—7% more than he had secured against the same challenger two years earlier.

Candidates can raise issues and make them dominate campaigns. Citizens can, too. Sometimes, candidates are in the market for issues to distinguish themselves from their opponents, to reach particular constituencies, or to show that they have a lot of ideas. Citizens' groups may provide the candidates with what they need—and, at the same time, heighten the public focus on their particular issues.

Even where candidates have other agendas to pursue, citizens can—through op-ed page articles, letters to the editors of newspapers and magazines, participation in debates and forums, etc.—make their issues ones that are also important for political candidates. Dialogues pursued in the media and at public gatherings inevitably become a part of the campaign itself.

Referendums and Initiatives

The American Founding Fathers set up our political system to be a representative, not a direct, democracy. Nevertheless, referendums—or popular votes on policy issues—have been used on occasion in various states for more than 200 years. The first occurred in 1778, when voters of the new state of Massachusetts rejected the state constitution that had been proposed by the state legislature.

By the mid-nineteenth century, it was commonplace for states to submit amendments to their constitutions, as approved by the state legislatures, to approval by the voters as well. These days, every state but Delaware allows some form of referendum, whether on city or county charter amendments, state or local bond issues, or a broader range of subjects. In addition, nearly half the states (most of them in the West) allow some type of *initiative*, a referendum initiated not in the state legislature but by popular demand. What are the alternatives?

Types of Referendums

There are two types of referendums: the constitutional referendum and the statutory referendum.

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Each can get on the ballot by petition, when submitted by the state legislature, or when mandated by the state constitution.

There are also two types of initiatives: the constitutional initiative and the statutory initiative. State laws require a petition, containing signatures equal in number to a fixed percentage of the electorate, to qualify an initiative for the ballot. Twenty-three states allow some type of initiative.

Referendums and initiatives can fulfill several purposes. The use of referendums on *constitutional* questions historically has served to allow a direct public voice on a question not of policy but of basic governmental structure, purpose, and/or values. When applied to ratify a step taken by a state legislature, a referendum can serve to legitimize a major governmental action or to indicate a public unwillingness to support the change. In this sense, it can take the legislature and its elected representatives off the hook.

Referendums on state constitutions or on bond issues would not be frowned upon by the Founding Fathers; initiatives that challenge the policy actions of elected represent atives—and, therefore, of republican government—probably would be. Nevertheless, initiatives are likely here to stay, and to be used by citizen groups and others to highlight their issue concerns, to stimulate voter turnout, to score public relations points and even, in some instances, to make public policy. In 1982, there were 239 public questions on the ballot in 42 states and the District of Columbia. Ten states and D.C. voted on the nuclear freeze question (one of them, Wisconsin, in its September primary election), along with 30 cities or counties. Over 100 congressional districts had the opportunity in 1982 to express an opinion on the nuclear freeze. 1984 presents additional opportunities.

An initiative or referendum can legitimize an issue, make it the focus of a political campaign, make the issue translate more easily into legislation in the next Congress, and stimulate voter turnout. It can also backfire unexpectedly. For example, a gun control initiative on the ballot in 1982 engendered an enormous counter-reaction from gun control opponents—and their surge in turnout probably cost Democrat Tom Bradley the governorship in his tight race against Republican George Deukmejian.

Referendums and initiatives can also backfire when they are confusing, complicated, or worded badly. In the early 1970s, a referendum in Michigan to extend daylight savings time lost, even though subsequent voter surveys showed that a clear majority of voters favored the extension. Many were so confused by the convoluted language that they had mistakenly voted the wrong way!

A concise and clear initiative, when pursued prudently and with savvy, can advance the cause of a citizens' group in many ways. However, referendums and initiatives are areas of citizen participation to be employed cautiously and with care; too many can dilute their impact, cause a counter-reaction or weaken the broader political system.

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Conclusion

The American political process is a little bit like a Swiss cheese: there are many openings, or points of access, for citizens to reach in and have an impact on decision-making. Though the system is complex, fluid and hard to interpret, this central fact of openness and accessibility is the key for citizens to understand the process and have an impact on it. With a little study of structures and players, and with some reliance on the expert lobbyists and group representatives who follow the process day in and day out, a citizen can both understand and interpret the movement of issues within the policy process—and begin to act to shape the outcomes. Nowhere is this more important than on issues related to nuclear arms policy—issues that may determine the fate of our nation and the world.

Appendix

Members of Key Congressional Committees
98th Congress, 1983-84

Armed Services Committees

House of Representatives

Melvin Price (D-IL), Chairman

Charles E. Bennett (D-FL)
Samuel S. Stratton (D-NY)
Bill Nichols (D-AL)
Dan Daniel (D-VA)
G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery (D-MS)
Les Aspin (D-WI)
Ronald V. Dellums (D-CA)
Patricia Schroeder (D-CO)
Abraham Kazen, Jr. (D-TX)
Antonio B. Won Pat (D-Guam)
Beverly B. Byron (D-MD)
Nicholas Mavroules (D-MA)
Earl Hutto (D-FL)
Ike Skelton (D-MO)
Marvin Leath (D-TX)
Dave McCurdy (D-OK)
Thomas M. Foglietta (D-PA)
Roy Dyson (D-MD)
Dennis M. Hertel (D-MI)
Marilyn Lloyd (D-TN)
Norman Sisisky (D-VA)
Richard Ray (D-GA)
John Spratt (D-SC)
Frank McCloskey (D-IN)
C. Robin Britt (D-NC)
Solomon P. Ortiz (D-TX)
Ronald D. Coleman (D-TX)
George (Buddy) Darden (D-GA)

William L. Dickinson (R-AL)
G. William Whitehurst (R-VA)
Floyd Spence (R-SC)
Marjorie S. Holt (R-MD)
Elwood H. (Bud) Hillis (R-IN)
Robert E. Badham (R-CA)
Bob Stump (R-AZ)
Jim Courter (R-NJ)
Larry J. Hopkins (R-KY)
Robert W. Davis (R-MI)
Ken Kramer (R-CO)
Duncan L. Hunter (R-CA)
Thomas F. Hartnett (R-SC)
Daniel B. Crane (R-IL)
David O'B. Martin (R-NY)
John R. Kasich (R-OH)

Senate

John G. Tower (R-TX), Chairman

Strom Thurmond (R-SC)
Barry M. Goldwater (R-AZ)
John W. Warner (R-VA)
Gordon [illegible]mphrey (R-NH)
William [illegible]ohen (R-ME)
Roger W. Jepsen (R-IA)
Dan Quayle (R-IN)
John P. East (R-NC)
Pete Wilson (R-CA)
Dan Evans (R-WA)

John C. Stennis (D-MS)
Sam Nunn (D-GA)
Gary Hart (D-CO)
J. James Exon (D-NE)
Carl M. Levin (D-MI)
Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA)
Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)

Defense Appropriations Subcommittees

House of Representatives

Joseph P. Addabbo (D-NY), Chairman

Bill Chappell, Jr. (D-FL)
John P. Murtha (D-PA)
Norman D. Dicks (D-WA)
Charles Wilson (D-TX)
W.G. (Bill) Hefner (D-NC)
Jack Hightower (D-TX)
Les AuCoin (D-OR)
Jack Edwards (R-AL)
J. Kenneth Robinson (R-VA)
Joseph M. McDade (R-PA)
C.W. Bill Young (R-FL)

Senate

Ted Stevens (R-AK), Chairman

Lowell P. Weicker (R-CT)
Jake Garn (R-UT)
James A. McClure (R-ID)
Mark Andrews (R-ND)
Bob Kasten (R-WI)
Alfonse M. D'Amato (R-NY)
Warren Rudman (R-NH)
Thad Cochran (R-MS)
John C. Stennis (D-MS)
William Proxmire (D-WI)
Daniel K. Inouye (D-HI)
Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC)
Thomas F. Eagleton (D-MO)
Lawton Chiles (D-FL)
J. Bennett Johnston (D-LA)
Walter D. Huddleston (D-KY)

Foreign Relations Committee

Senate

Charles H. Percy (R-IL), Chairman

Howard H. Baker (R-TN)
Jesse A. Helms (R-NC)
Richard G. Lugar (R-IN)
Charles McC. Mathias (R-MD)
Nancy L. Kassebaum (R-KS)
Rudy Boschwitz (R-MN)
Larry Pressler (R-SD)
Frank H. Murkowski (R-AK)
Claiborne Pell (D-RI)
Joseph R. Biden (D-DE)
John Glenn (D-OH)
Paul S. Sarbanes (D-MD)
Edward Zorinsky (D-NE)
Paul E. Tsongas (D-MA)
Alan Cranston (D-CA)
Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT)

Foreign Affairs Committee

House of Representatives

Dante B. Fascell (D-FL), Chairman

Lee H. Hamilton (D-IN)
Gus Yatron (D-PA)
Stephen Solarz (D-NY)
Don Bonker (D-WA)
Gerry E. Studds (D-MA)
Andy Ireland (D-FL)*
Dan Mica (D-FL)
Michael D. Barnes (D-MD)
Howard Wolpe (D-MI)
George W. Crockett, Jr. (D-MI)
Sam Gedjenson (D-CT)
Mervyn M. Dymally (D-CA)
Tom Lantos (D-CA)
Peter H. Kostmayer (D-PA)
Robert G. Torricelli (D-NJ)
Lawrence J. Smith (D-FL)
Howard L. Berman (D-CA)
Harry Reid (D-NV)
Mel Levine (D-CA)
Edward F. Feighan (D-OH)
Robert Garcia (D-NY)

William S. Broomfield (R-MI)
Larry Winn, Jr. (R-KS)
Benjamin Gilman (R-NY)
Robert J. Lagomarsino (R-CA)
Joel Pritchard (R-WA)
Jim Leach (R-IA)
Toby Roth (R-WI)
Olympia J. Snowe (R-ME)
Henry J. Hyde (R-IL)
Gerald B. Solomon (R-NY)
Douglas K. Bereuter (R-NE)
Mark D. Siljander (R-MI)
Ed Zschau (R-CA)

*In June 1984, Rep. Ireland switched parties, becoming a Republican and necessitating a change in committee assignments.

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United Campuses to Prevent Nuclear War (UCAM) is an organization of university students, faculty and staff working to end the nuclear arms race. Founded in 1982, UCAM sponsors educational, lobbying and issue-oriented electoral activities. The organization encourages the teaching of courses on nuclear war and arms control. UCAM supports a bilateral, verifiable nuclear freeze as the first step toward major worldwide arms control and disarmament. United Campuses to Prevent Nuclear War has contacts on more than 600 campuses in the United States and Canada.

Common Cause is a nonprofit, nonpartisan citizens' lobbying organization supported by dues and contributions of more than 250,000 members nationwide. Since its founding in 1970, Common Cause has mobilized public concern into legislative action to help end U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, to challenge excessive government secrecy, to repeal the oil depletion allowance and other tax loopholes, to stop the corrupting influence of political money in federal elections and, recently, to help pass a bilateral, verifiable nuclear arms freeze and to oppose further funds for production of the MX missile.

For further information about how citizens can influence government decision-making on nuclear arms issues, contact:

United Campuses to
Prevent Nuclear War (UCAM)
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Who Decides? A Citizen's Guide to Government Decision-Making on Nuclear War helps citizens understand *how* decisions are made in the American political process. This process, as author Norman Ornstein writes, "is a little bit like a Swiss cheese." There are many openings for citizens to reach in, have an impact, and help secure the future.



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